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1 Introduction
Evolutionary games were rst developed by biologists (e.g., Maynard Smith and Price 1973)
and later adapted and extended by economists (see, e.g., Friedman 1991). While classical
game theory makes strong assumptions about the players cognitive capacities, evolutionary
game theory replaces rationality by natural selection. Specically, rather than maximizing
expected payo¤s, the players in evolutionary games are replicators who reproduce their
kind. The well-known replicator dynamic equation (Taylor and Jonker 1978) predicts that
the rate of growth in the distribution of population playing each strategy would be roughly
proportional to the deviation of that strategys payo¤ from the populations average payo¤.
There is, however, an important di¤erence between evolutionary dynamics and stan-
dard repeated games in the following sense. In evolutionary games, players are essentially
programmed to follow some rule with no appeal to rationality. On the other hand, the distri-
bution of strategies across a population can be interpreted as a sequence of mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium. In the latter case, a necessary implication is that there should be no ser-
ial correlation or dependence in the distribution of strategies played in each period. In this
note, I present evidence that the strength of evolutionary dynamics is inversely related to the
degree of competition among players. This suggests that competition favors rational-choice
game theory.
A relatively few papers tested mixed-strategy equilibrium play using nonexperimental
data (Chiappori et al. 2002 and Palacios-Huerta 2003 using penalty kicks in soccer; Walker
and Wooders 2001 and Hsu et al. 2007 using serve directions in tennis). The authors
considered whether players switch from one direction to another too often or too infrequently
to be random. One observation is that serial independence seems to hold more often for
penalty kicks than for tennis matches. One possibility is that the kicker is under more
pressure than a tennis player considering the nature of these two sports. Substantiating this
conjecture would require a set of quasi-experiments across settings that only di¤er by the
level of competition.
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I argue that application statistics from a collegiate university (where governing authorities
are divided between a number of constituent colleges) can provide a testing ground for the
relation between competition and evolutionary dynamics, where payo¤s in the previous year
can potentially a¤ect the current distribution of strategies. In the next Section, I explain why
Cambridge Universitys admissions system generates a unique data set of quasi-experiments
from a large high-stake game with adequate information environment. Section 3 estimates
the replicator dynamic equation for each undergraduate subject o¤ered and show the main
result that the coe¢ cient of the dynamic is inversely related to the applications-to-o¤ers
ratio.
2 Data
In Cambridge, the Colleges are responsible for admitting students to the Universitys degree
programs. Unlike applying to (multiple) universities, a prospective student can only apply to
a single College in a given year. All applications, where interviewing process is an important
factor, are handled by the Colleges. It is fair to say that applicants are highly motivated and
decide carefully which College to apply. It seems reasonable to assume that applicants are
randomly drawn from a single population, and they do not attempt to inuence the future
applicants action.1
The information environment is that the University started publishing application sta-
tistics on their website from the academic year 2004-05. In particular, application statistics
were broken down for each subject by College (and for each College by subject). This means
that the prospective students could see the number of applicants and o¤ers in the previous
few years for all College and the subject that they were considering to study.2 Similarly,
one of the control variables, the Colleges ranking, was also published by the press and
1Cambridge Colleges are committed to non-discrimination and equal opportunity, so it is hard to think
of any reason why observed applicant characteristics should matter.
2Oxford University operates a similar College-based admissions system; however, Oxford University has
not published disaggregated application statistics for each subject and College combination, which renders
the information environment unsuitable for the present study.
3
well-advertised nationally.
There are a couple of institutional details that need to be taken into account when
dening the strategies and payo¤s. First, applicants can make an open application without
specifying a College.3 However, this option is not included in the strategy set because each
open application is allocated to a College using a computer algorithm, and Colleges treat
them in exactly the same manner as direct applications to the College. Accordingly, the
University has not published statistics for open applications category, and we do not observe
the payo¤s from this strategy.4
Second, the Colleges jointly operate a pool system, where Colleges can make an o¤er to
those who applied to other Colleges and were subsequently placed in the pool. That is, the
system provides a second chance for those who were marginally rejected by their College of
choice. The application statistics that are available on the Universitys website contained
such disaggregated numbers for all categories (i.e., o¤ers, of which o¤ers through pool, and
o¤ers through pool by another College), which allowed applicants to calculate the success
rate from choosing any College.
There are 29 constituent Colleges that admit undergraduate students, which represent the
strategy set of the players. Among these, three Colleges are only for women, and another
four are exclusively for mature students (i.e., 21 years or older); however, this would not
pose a problem unless these applicants behave very di¤erently from the general pool of the
applicants. The data runs from academic year 2004 to 2009, and there are 24 subjects in the
sample, which represent 24 quasi-experimental rounds. That is, the strength of replicator
dynamic is assumed to di¤er across subjects.5
3Of the total applications received during the sample period, 12.9 percent were originally open applica-
tions.
4The information on the number of open applications and their assignments to Colleges were obtained
from the Universitys central administration by request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
5I excluded 4-year Classics because the program is relatively small compared to the regular 3-year Classics,
and also Linguistic because the program started only in 2009.
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3 Estimation
The following exposition is standard in the literature. The set of strategies is S = f1; : : : ; ng,
where i 2 S represents a College. A population state is x 2 X = fx 2 Rn+ j
P
i2S xi = 1g,
where xi represents the proportion of applicants choosing College i. The observed state
space includes only direct applications to each College. (One may be reminded that payo¤s
from open applications are not directly observed.) Thus, x represents the population state
that can be modelled as an evolutionary dynamic. The expected payo¤ of strategy i is a
function Fi(x^) : X ! R, where x^ is the payo¤-relevant population state, which will be
explained below. The average payo¤ experienced by the population in each round is denoted
as F (x^) =
P
i2S x^iFi(x^).
I assume that the applicants goal is to get an o¤er. The total number of o¤ers from
College i is the number of places o¤ered directly by College i, excluding o¤ers made to
applicants through the pool, but including o¤ers received by its applicants through the pool.
That is, from the standpoint of a prospective applicant, an o¤er received through the pool
has the same weight as an o¤er made by the College directly, when calculating the expected
probability of an o¤er. Then, the expected payo¤ of choosing College i is the proportion of
total o¤ers to the number of applications (which includes open allocations). Since applicants
do not separately observe direct and open applications, this is how the applicants perceive
the relevant payo¤s.
A well-known replicator dynamic equation (Maynard Smith 1982) can be written as
follows:
_xi
xi
=
~Fi(x^)
F (x^)
,
where _x is the time derivative and ~Fi(x^) = Fi(x^)  F (x^) denotes the excess payo¤ of strategy
i relative to the population average.
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The empirical counterpart can be specied as
lnxi;t+1   lnxi;t = + 

lnFi(x^)  ln F (x^)

t
+ Xi;t +  t + ci + "i;t,
where  t is the year dummy, ci is the College dummy, and "i;t is the error term. Xi;t is
a set of time-varying covariates, which include the annual College ranking and the total
number of o¤ers made in year t, both of which are casually suspected to a¤ect the number
of applications.6
I estimate the above equation for each of 24 subjects using OLS and xed-e¤ects spec-
ications. The key parameter is , which measures the strength of evolutionary dynamics.
Table 1 shows only the  coe¢ cients from each estimation, where the four columns are self-
explanatory. Not surprisingly, the results give some support for the central prediction of
evolutionary dynamics in the sense that the  coe¢ cients are generally positive and some-
times statistically signicant. Fixed-e¤ects and the covariates separately do not seem to
change the estimates signicantly; however, jointly they increase the estimates substantially.
In column (4), in 20 out of 24 subjects the coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signicant.7
The question of interests is what explains this relatively large variation in the estimated
coe¢ cients across subjects. As previously mentioned, the level of competition in each subject
may explain the di¤erential strength of evolutionary dynamics. Therefore, I regress the
estimated coe¢ cients  on the (average) o¤ers-to-applications ratio for each subject. The
results are shown in Table 2 along with scatterplots in Figure 1. They show a clear, strong
and robust relationship between the two variables with upward-sloping tted lines. This
means that the previous years excess payo¤ is a weaker predictor for the applicantschoice
of Colleges in the current year for subjects that have on average been more competitive than
others.
6The selection of covariates is based on the authors informal conversation with Admissions Tutors at
Cambridge.
7The results are very similar to FE specications where an AR(1) error correction model is estimated.
6
4 Conclusion
This note empirically measures the strength of evolutionary dynamics in college applications
and relates it to the degree of competition in each subject discipline. The evidence suggests
a negative relationship between the two, which is in line with the general notion that com-
petitive pressures tend to favor playersrational choice behavior rather than naive adaptive
dynamics. That is, in terms of conventional game theory, the previous rounds payo¤s tend
to be a predictor for the choice of current strategy only when the ex ante payo¤s are generally
high. One potentially avenue for future research is to examine the relationship between the
strength of evolutionary dynamics and the level of competition across markets or industries.
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Table. 1: Estimation of Replicator Dynamic Equation for Each Subject. (* signicant at
10% level, ** signicant at 5% level, *** signicant at 1% level.)
Table. 2: Regression of Coe¢ cients. (p-values are in the parentheses.)
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Figure 1: Relationship between Beta and Success Rate
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